نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار، جامعهشناسی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Extended Abstract
Introduction and Objectives: The ultimate goal of knowledge is intervention, and its prerequisite is acquiring a correct understanding of the reality in which one is to intervene. This article’s focus on “subject,” “approach,” and “field” is an effort to bring the existing sociology of religion as close as possible to Islam and to Iran, with the consideration that this cannot be achieved except through a revision of the constitutive “presuppositions” that shape them.
In examining the subject-related presuppositions of religion, we arrive at its “signifying” (or expressive) nature (dalālatī būdan), its “determinacy” (taʿayyun dāshtan), and its “ideological nature” (īdiyūlūzhīk būdan). Reflection on prevalent theories in the sociology of religion also reveals that they are often afflicted by the flaw of “reductionism” (taḥwīlgarāyī) and are generalized to fields distinct from the contexts of their own emergence and application. Consequently, they inevitably overlook the different conditions of these fields, such as “agency” (fāʿiliyyat) and the appropriate, requisite “place” (makān) of religion in society, and they adopt a biased and pathological approach to its specific issues, particularly in situations where religion is “linked with power.”
The focus on presuppositions in this article is due to their highly determining effects on the subject matter and its theoretical approaches. They are capable of compensating for some of the pervasive shortcomings in sociology and its subfields in Iran and can strengthen its metaphysical foundations.
In terms of subject matter, the article is among works that engage in critique and revision of sociology or a specific branch of sociology, with the clarification that “critique of sociology” (naqd-i jāmiʿahshināsī) is distinct from “sociological critique” (naqd-i jāmiʿahshinākhtī), and the former itself has various types, ranging from its more internal critiques to completely external ones. Based on this, the critique of sociology can be broadly separated into two main categories: First, critiques and revisions directed against the conceptual and theoretical efforts of contemporary sociologists or their predecessors; and second, critiques that sociologists and non-sociologists direct at sociology itself as a branch of knowledge, demanding the application of certain considerations and changes in some of its foundations and pillars. This category, which is also considerably more diverse, sometimes goes beyond this and is prone to becoming a threshold literature (adabiyyāt-i āstānahʾī) of the discipline, placing it on the path of more serious changes. Threshold and external critiques are the kind that are offered based on foundations and logic other than those of sociology—even if the critic is not aware of this or does not state it. The subject of such critiques is not the object and issues of sociology, but sociology itself, focusing on its “subject-related presuppositions” and “theoretical foundations.”
Sociology of religion, according to the necessity and agenda of the science, has found religion to be similar to its other objects and views it as a “social phenomenon”; however, it is expected to also pay attention to its distinct and unique characteristics. Three key characteristics of religion that have significant impacts on its subject matter and theories and may alter its research path are as follows:
Signifying and Expressive Nature (Dalālatī Būdan)
Religion is not merely a physical or behavioral phenomenon; rather, it carries content and conveys meaning and is among expressive social phenomena. Signifying and expressive phenomena can be distinguished at five levels:
Non-signifying phenomena that, under specific conditions, may convey meaning. Examples include artifacts and objects obtained in archaeological excavations.
Conventional signs and symbols in a society.
Auditory phenomena and oral language.
Written content phenomena.
Prescriptive and performative content phenomena. Religious texts, regardless of their origin and validity, and ideologies with manifestos, belong to this category.
Religion’s placement at the fifth level of signification means it is an “intentional” (qaṣdmand) phenomenon, and reducing it to its social functions and manifestations without considering its prescriptive content leads to an incomplete and incorrect understanding of it.
Essentialism and Determinacy (Zātʾangārī wa Taʿayyun Dāshtan)
Due to its signifying nature, religion has a definite and determined essence and is sensitive to arbitrary changes. This characteristic causes religion, unlike some fluid and constructed phenomena, to possess doctrinal stability and constancy (pāydārī wa s̱abāt-i āmūzihʾī). Overlooking this determinacy leads the sociologist into error when analyzing the social processes of religion.
Ideological Nature (Īdiyūlūzhīk Būdan)
Religion is not a collection of personal beliefs for individual use; rather, beyond that, it is a program for collective life and, when necessary, for entering and intervening in power relations. This attribute gives religion an ideological nature and turns it into an active and influential agent in the public sphere.
Reductionism (Taḥwīlgarāyī)
In its second part, the article critiques the dominant approach and theories in the sociology of religion. A large portion of classical and even contemporary theoretical literature in the sociology of religion suffers from the flaw of “reductionism”; meaning it reduces religion to non-religious phenomena that have simpler logic and requirements, thereby diminishing it.
Agency in the Field (Fāʿiliyyat dar Maydān)
The reductionistic approach and strategy in studies of religion has led to the disregard of religion’s agency—which has decisive effects on the field—and kept a part of its reality concealed. This shortcoming occurs when religion is viewed merely as a reactive and passive entity in social relations, and its determining effects, whether direct or indirect, are ignored. The critique of ignoring religion’s agency is valid for all religions and is not exclusive to Islam, which possesses a greater agency than other religions. The article’s emphasis on noting and observing these points and considerations is more aligned with maintaining fidelity to reality as it is, rather than advocacy for religion.
Taboo-Breaking of Power (Tābūshikanī az Qudrat)
The article’s emphasis on observing “agency” is based on the general and common requirement of religions, which has been overlooked due to the dominance of reductionistic approaches in the sociology of religion. The taboo-breaking of power, however, is another overlooked reality that is only true for some religions, specifically regarding Islam. Sociologists’ neglect of this also stems from the doctrine and historical experience of Western Christianity and the influences that the dominant sociological tradition has absorbed from it. The tabooing of power, which also has other roots, has led scholars to treat any relationship between religion and power as inherently negative and pathological, and to analyze it through such prior assumptions.
However, this taboo has never been a relevant issue in the doctrine and historical experience of Islam and has been broken more clearly in recent times. The emergence of religious states and religious-political movements is a reality that cannot be analyzed with theoretical tools derived from the Western secular experience. The article claims that power-holders in the West, along with some social science scholars, have attempted to take this tool away from believers and from the process of establishing religion by employing the policy of “power tabooing.”
What is expected from the sociology of religion in Iran is increased attentiveness to its proximate field of study and the highest possible fidelity to the prevailing realities within it. This task primarily requires certain revisions and conceptual creativity, and the introduction of considerations that enable it to explain new situations where religion is neither passive nor marginal; rather, it is at the core of society and linked to power.
In conclusion, the article reaffirms its covenant and commitment to sociology, stating that sociology, while universal, is an inherently contextual and indigenous form of knowledge (dānishī būmī), because it arises from contemplation of its surrounding realities. Moving beyond the stage of “reading sociology” (jāmiʿahshināsīkhānī) and “knowing sociology” (jāmiʿahshināsīdānī) toward the stage of “doing sociology” (jāmiʿahshināsī kardan) requires courage in critiquing classical presuppositions and attention to the historical and theological particularities of the Iranian field. This revision not only does not diminish the validity of the science but also brings it closer to reality by achieving “sociological objectivity” (ʿayniyyat-i jāmiʿahshinākhtī), thereby improving its capacity for intervention.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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